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GETTING OUT OF THE RECESSION?
gennaro zezza
In our Strategic Analysis of December 2009 (Papadimitriou, Hannsgen, and Zezza 2009) we argued
that, without policy action, the U.S. economy would move from a deep recession to a period of slug-
gish growth, and that unemployment would remain very high for some years to come.
We now update this exercise, using new evidence, to confirm that strong policy action is
required to achieve full employment in the medium term—and that a persistently high govern-
ment deficit will be required to produce a reduction in the unemployment rate.
Fuel for Growth?
Our approach to the dynamics of real GDP is based on the analysis of the likely paths of the com-
ponents of demand rather than the evolution of potential output. The largest component of
aggregate demand in the United States is consumption (70 percent of GDP), which needs to be
financed either by disposable income or by borrowing.
Our last projection, of sluggish growth in the U.S. economy, relied on the principal assump-
tion—based on the available evidence up to the second quarter of 2009—that consumer and
business borrowing would remain in negative territory for the rest of 2009.
The latest figures published by the Federal Reserve show that our assumptions were indeed
correct. Household borrowing in the third quarter was a negative $351 billion, or 2.5 percent of
GDP (Figure 1), with a large drop in both mortgages and consumer credit. Data on consumer
credit for the last quarter of 2009 show a drop of $9 billion in the stock of credit outstanding,
again implying that net borrowing was negative for the rest of last year, and this probably con-
tinued in the first two months of 2010.
The stock of household debt and the flow of net borrowing have thus been falling (Figure 1),
suggesting that households are still operating to reduce excessive indebtedness. Mortgages and
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spending, together with the purchasing power of disposable
income.
Real disposable income has been increasing in the last
two quarters (Figure 2), but the purchasing power of the wage
bill has been falling.1 The increase in disposable income is
therefore not the result of increases in wages but rather the
result of net government transfers to the private sector, and
profits. While government transfers are likely to boost con-
sumption, the effects of profits on aggregate demand are more
questionable: real investment in the fourth quarter of 2009
was still 14 percent below its level in the previous year.
Another potential support for aggregate demand and
employment derives from net exports. In our last report we
showed that a further devaluation of the U.S. dollar, particu-
larly against the currencies of countries that have a sizable
surplus with the United States, would have been an effective
stimulus to demand. As Figure 3 shows,2 the U.S. dollar lost
value throughout most of 2009, mainly against the euro and
the Japanese yen, but not against China’s currency. While the
latest movements3in the dollar will be beneficial for U.S. exports
to the eurozone (and Japan, to a minor degree), the underval-
uation of the yuan is not reducing U.S. imports from China,
and is proving detrimental to the stimulus the United States
may get from net exports. Besides, the dollar has stopped its
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descent, so no further improvement on this front can be
expected in the short term.
In sum, it seems likely that any increase in private sector
aggregate demand in 2009 was obtained as a result of the fis-
cal stimulus, without which the recession would have been
much deeper.
A Baseline Scenario with Persistent
Unemployment
We have now updated our December 2009 baseline scenario
with the newly available data, using the same projection strat-
egy. We use the latest projections by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF 2010) for real GDP growth in major U.S.
trade partners, and revise our projections for revenues and
outlays of the government under current policies on the basis
of the latest report of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO
2010). The CBO is projecting a decrease in the federal deficit
from 9.9 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2009 to 2.6 percent in
2015, with a strong upward adjustment to government rev-
enues starting in 2011. 
We adopt a similar trajectory for the general government
account as the starting point for our baseline. We retain our
assumptions that borrowing by the household and nonfinancial
business sectors remains negative, so that household debt
Figure 1 Household Borrowing and Debt, 1990Q1–2009Q3 
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Figure 2 Real Disposable Income and Wages, 1990–2009 
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Source: BEArebounds to 73 percent of GDP by the end of the simulation
period, while nonfinancial business debt declines to 65 per-
cent of GDP—which used to be the norm. The assumptions
for our baseline scenario are therefore as neutral as possible,
and do not consider the possibility of another major crash in
either the stock market or the housing sector, nor a more opti-
mistic (or pessimistic) hypothesis about the price of oil, the
stability of the euro, and so on.
Our baseline results are summarized in Figure 4.
Insufficient growth in all components of aggregate demand
imply that unemployment will hover around 10 percent,
while output slowly recovers to a growth rate of about 2.5 per-
cent only in 2014. It is assumed that the federal deficit will
decrease to about 5 percent of GDP by 2015, while the balance
of payments on the current account is balanced in the same
year. Notwithstanding the increase in government revenues
and lower growth in government outlays, government debt
will rise by about 30 percent of GDP by the end of the simu-
lation period, since the deficit will remain large relative to the
GDP growth rate.4 The recovery in stock-flow imbalances,
which we have been warning about for so long, will therefore
come at too high a cost for output and employment, calling
for strong policy intervention.
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We chose to simulate our baseline scenario under “neu-
tral” assumptions and official references for growth in U.S.
trading partners and fiscal policy. However, we do not believe
such a scenario to be realistic, since the projected path for 
fiscal policy under current legislation—as outlined by the
CBO—usually underestimates government deficits. 
A Growing Public Debt Will Bring 
Unemployment Down
A first alternative scenario to be considered uses more plausi-
ble assumptions about fiscal policy than those of the CBO.
The CBO (2010) notes that its “baseline projections under-
state the budget deficits that would arise under many
observers’ interpretation of current policy, as opposed to cur-
rent law. . . . If the tax cuts were made permanent, the AMT
was indexed for inflation, and annual appropriations kept
pace with GDP, the deficit in 2020 would be nearly the same,
historically large, share of GDP that it is today, and debt held
by the public would equal nearly 100 percent of GDP” (11–12).
Accordingly, in our alternative scenario we assume permanent
tax cuts and a larger increase in government outlays related




















































Figure 4  U.S. Main Sector Balances and Unemployment in
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Our results, shown in Figure 5, show that the unemploy-
ment rate would decline to 7 percent by the end of the simu-
lation period, with output growing at 3 percent or above from
the end of 2011 onward. The government deficit remains high
relative to GDP, with public debt growing at approximately
101 percent of GDP by the end of 2015. We assume that mon-
etary policy is able to keep interest rates at the current, very
low level, so that the increase in public debt implies an
increase in interest payments to about 2.5 percent of GDP by
the end of our projection.
The recovery in output, driven by public expenditure and
public transfers, will have an impact on the current account
balance, which stabilizes around 4 percent of GDP. We esti-
mate that about half of the external deficit, or 2.1 percent of
GDP, will arise from oil imports (we project the price of oil to
stabilize in relative terms).
As in our previous reports, we keep claiming that an
expansionary fiscal policy will be effective in sustaining out-
put and employment, albeit at a cost of a deterioration in the
external balance. In our view, our alternative scenario, where
the growth in output is obtained through a growing public
debt, is to be preferred to our baseline scenario of persistent
unemployment. Any sector that increases its debt relative to
its income is by definition becoming more fragile, but as long
as the United States maintains its international role as issuer
of the major reserve currency, it is difficult to believe that for-
eign countries will be unwilling to finance its public debt.
However, this scenario perpetuates—albeit on a smaller
scale—the international imbalances that characterized the
previous decade, and a different growth strategy is needed.
Conclusion
The current recession has not been simply the result of a tem-
porary, unexpected shock to the financial sector. Rather, it has
been the inevitable consequence of an unbalanced growth
path that the United States has followed over the past 20 years
(Godley 1999). It will therefore be extremely difficult to deal
with its consequences—specifically, unemployment.
In this report we have shown that a large and persistent
government deficit is and will be needed in the short run in
order to reduce the unemployment rate. This implies a grow-
ing public debt, which will be sustainable as long as interest
rates are kept at the current low level—and a smaller cost to
future generations than that implied by an unemployment
rate persistently above 10 percent.
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Notes
1.  Figure 2 reports personal disposable income and wage
and salary disbursements using the consumption deflator.
2.  Index numbers in Figure 3 are such that a devaluation of
the U.S. dollar is reflected in a lower value of the indexes.
3.  This report was prepared before the turmoil in Greece
and other countries in Europe, which has led to an
appreciation of the U.S. dollar. Our argument is thus
reinforced: a stronger dollar and slower growth in
Europe both imply smaller increases in U.S. net exports.
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Sources: BEA; authors’ calculations  4.  Abstracting from capital gains, inflation, and so on, gov-
ernment debt B grows with deficit D according to 
B(t) = B(t-1) + D(t)
Dividing by GDP, with g as the nominal GDP growth
rate, we get
b(t) = b(t-1)/(1+g) + d(t)
where b and d denote debt- and deficit-to-GDP ratios,
respectively. The debt-to-GDP ratio will increase when
d*(1 + g) - b*g > 0
If the debt-to-GDP ratio is 100 percent, any deficit
larger than the GDP growth rate will imply an increase
in the debt-to-GDP ratio. If the debt-to-GDP ratio is
smaller, an even smaller deficit is sufficient for debt to
increase.
References
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2010. The Budget and
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020.
Washington, D.C.: CBO. January.
Godley, W. 1999. Seven Unsustainable Processes: Medium-
term Prospects and Policies for the United States and the
World. Strategic Analysis. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.:
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. January.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2010. World Economic
Outlook Update: A Policy-driven, Multispeed Recovery.
Washington, D.C.: IMF. January 26.
Papadimitriou, D. B., G. Hannsgen, and G. Zezza. 2009.
Sustaining Recovery: Medium-term Prospects and Policies
for the U.S. Economy. Strategic Analysis. Annandale-on-
Hudson, N.Y.: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
December.
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
Recent Levy Institute Publications
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Getting Out of the Recession?
gennaro zezza
March 2010
Sustaining Recovery: Medium-term Prospects and Policies
for the U.S. Economy
dimitri b. papadimitriou, greg hannsgen, and 
gennaro zezza
December 2009
Recent Rise in Federal Government and Federal Reserve
Liabilities: Antidote to a Speculative Hangover
dimitri b. papadimitriou and greg hannsgen
April 2009
A “People First” Strategy: Credit Cannot Flow When There
Are No Creditworthy Borrowers or Profitable Projects
james k. galbraith
April 2009
Flow of Funds Figures Show the Largest Drop in Household
Borrowing in the Last 40 Years
gennaro zezza
January 2009
LEVY INSTITUTE MEASURE OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
Has Progress Been Made in Alleviating Racial Economic
Inequality?
thomas masterson, ajit zacharias, and 
edward n. wolff
November 2009
New Estimates of Economic Inequality in America, 
1959–2004
ajit zacharias, edward n. wolff,
and thomas masterson
April 20096 Strategic Analysis, March 2010
PUBLIC POLICY BRIEFS
The Trouble with Pensions: Toward an Alternative Public
Policy to Support Retirement
yeva nersisyan and l. randall wray
No. 109, 2010
Why President Obama Should Care about “Care”: 
An Effective and Equitable Investment Strategy for Job
Creation
rania antonoulos, kijong kim, thomas masterson,
and ajit zacharias
No. 108, 2010
No Going Back: Why We Cannot Restore Glass-Steagall’s




stephanie a. kelton and l. randall wray
No. 106, 2009 (Highlights, No. 106A)
It Isn’t Working: Time for More Radical Policies
éric tymoigne and l. randall wray
No. 105, 2009 (Highlights, No. 105A)
The New New Deal Fracas
Did Roosevelt’s “Anticompetitive” Legislation Slow the
Recovery from the Great Depression?
dimitri b. papadimitriou and greg hannsgen
No. 104, 2009 (Highlights, No. 104A)
Financial and Monetary Issues as the Crisis Unfolds
james k. galbraith
No. 103, 2009 (Highlights, No. 103A)
The Global Crisis and the Implications for Developing
Countries and the BRICs
Is the B Really Justified?
jan kregel
No. 102, 2009 (Highlights, No. 102A)
Promoting Gender Equality through Stimulus Packages and
Public Job Creation
Lessons Learned from South Africa’s Expanded Public Works
Programme
rania antonopoulos
No. 101, 2009 (Highlights, No. 101A)
POLICY NOTES




Fiscal Stimulus, Job Creation, and the Economy: What Are
the Lessons of the New Deal?
greg hannsgen and dimitri b. papadimitriou
2009/10
Banks Running Wild: The Subversion of Insurance by “Life
Settlements” and Credit Default Swaps
marshall auerback and l. randall wray
2009/9
Who Gains from President Obama’s Stimulus Package . . .
And How Much?
ajit zacharias, thomas masterson, and kijong kim
Special Report, June 12, 2009








The “Unintended Consequences” Game
martin shubik
2009/6Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
A Proposal for a Federal Employment Reserve Authority
martin shubik
2009/5




Decomposition of the Black-White Wage Differential in the
Physician Market
tsu-yu tsao and andrew pearlman
No. 588, March 2010
The Global Financial Crisis and the Shift to Shadow
Banking
yeva nersisyan and l. randall wray
No. 587, February 2010
Is This the Minsky Moment for Reform of Financial
Regulation?
jan kregel
No. 586, February 2010
Is Reregulation of the Financial System an Oxymoron?
jan kregel
No. 585, February 2010
The Global Crisis and the Future of the Dollar: Toward
Bretton Woods III?
jörg bibow
No. 584, February 2010
The Euro and Its Guardian of Stability: The Fiction and
Reality of the 10th Anniversary Blast
jörg bibow
No. 583, November 2009
Minsky Moments, Russell Chickens, and Gray Swans: The
Methodological Puzzles of the Financial Instability Crisis
alessandro vercelli
No. 582, November 2009
Lessons from the New Deal: Did the New Deal Prolong or
Worsen the Great Depression?
greg hannsgen and dimitri b. papadimitriou
No. 581, October 2009
An Alternative View of Finance, Saving, Deficits, and
Liquidity
l. randall wray
No. 580, October 2009
A Perspective on Minsky Moments: The Core of 
the Financial Instability Hypothesis in Light of the
Subprime Crisis
alessandro vercelli
No. 579, October 2009
Money Manager Capitalism and the Global 
Financial Crisis
l. randall wray
No. 578, September 2009
Explaining the Gender Wage Gap in Georgia
tamar khitarishvili
No. 577, September 2009
A Financial Sector Balance Approach and the Cyclical
Dynamics of the U.S. Economy
paolo casadio and antonio paradiso
No. 576, September 2009
Market Failure and Land Concentration
fatmua gül ünal
No. 575, August 2009
This Strategic Analysis and all other Levy Institute publica-




The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
Blithewood
PO Box 5000
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000
Address Service Requested